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ANTITRUST
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals this year was given the opportunity
to address issues of recent import in the field of antitrust, many of which
have been the subject of United States Supreme Court decisions. Among
those Supreme Court pronouncements which influenced the appellate court
were decisions that increased the scope of activities in interstate commerce,'
barred suits by indirect purchasers, 2 limited antitrust immunity under the
state-action doctrine,3 and prohibited contribution among antitrust defend-
ants.4 The legacy of these Supreme Court decisions, including one which
reversed a Tenth Circuit opinion,5 is the Tenth Circuit's adherence to estab-
lished Supreme Court antitrust sentiment.
This article will discuss the trend of Tenth Circuit decisions which es-
pouse the antitrust mandates of the Supreme Court. The court's other deci-
sions will be briefly reviewed.
I. THE "EFFECTS TEST" OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a long-standing jurisdic-
tional issue in Mishler v. St. Anthony's Itospza/ Systems, 6 where a physician
challenged a hospital's refusal to include his name on a referral list as being a
restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. 7 In its holding, the court con-
fronted, both expressly and implicitly, two barriers traditionally raised
against physicians asserting claims under the federal antitrust laws in the
health care industry: 1) whether members of learned professions are subject
to the antitrust laws, and 2) whether a substantial enough effect on interstate
commerce has been shown to invoke federal antitrust jurisdiction.
The court, in conformity with the modern trend, broadened the scope
of the federal antitrust laws by implicitly recognizing application of the anti-
trust laws to the learned profession of medicine, and by expressly finding
that local hospital activities bear a substantial enough relationship to inter-
state commerce to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal antitrust laws. In so
holding, the court maintained its established position that to invoke federal
jurisdiction, it is the effect of the defendant's allegedly illegal conduct on
1. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
2. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
3. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
4. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
5. Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), rev'g 630
F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court held that an ordinance enacted pursuant to
Colorado's "home rule" authority did not constitute state action exempting Boulder from anti-
trust scrutiny because the city's action did not promote a clearly articulated state policy. See
Suprene Court Review, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 59 DEN. L.J. 399 (1982).
6. [1981-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,342 (10th Cir. 1981).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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interstate commerce that must be substantial, not the effect of the defend-
ant's overall business activities. 8
A. Learned Professions Doctrine
Legal rules which have protected certain professions or their practices
from the antitrust laws have been eroding in recent years. For example, the
"learned profession" exemption that insulated lawyers and physicians from
antitrust liability was struck down by the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar.9 The Supreme Court recently reemphasized its adherence to
the principles espoused in Goldfarb in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society. 0
In Goldfarb, the Court refrained from strictly applying antitrust regula-
tion to lawyers and physicians by recognizing that some "forms of competi-
tion usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical
standards of a profession."" Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
noted in Goldfarb that some professional practices that promote valid health
or welfare goals might be beyond the purview of antitrust enforcement.
12
The same principle was recognized in Mar'copa.' 3 Despite the health profes-
sion's admirable goal of promoting quality health care, the growing volume
of litigation indicates that some practices of the health care industry may be
regulated by antitrust laws.'
4
The customary practice of hospitals allocating staff privileges to physi-
cians who are deemed qualified to use the hospital facility had been unfet-
8. [1981-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,342, at 74,586.
9. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Court struck down a state bar association's minimum fee
schedule that discouraged price competition among lawyers who examined titles. The opinion
made clear that "certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers [was] within the reach of the Sher-
man Act .... " Id at 793.
10. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982). The Court struck down an agreement by two county medical
societies which established maximum fees that participating doctors would accept for services
performed under specified health insurance plans. The Court held the agreement was aper se
violation under the Sherman Act as price fixing. Id at 2475. See also Halper, Arizona v. Mari-
copa County: 4 Stern Antitrust Warning to Healthcare Providers, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Oct.
1982, 38.
11. 421 U.S. at 792 (citing United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336
(1952); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611-13 (1935)).
12. 421 U.S. at 792.
13. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982). The Court stated:
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 n. 17 (1975), we stated that the "pub-
lic service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular
practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently." See National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). The price fixing agreements in this case, however, are
not premised on public service or ethical norms. The respondents do not argue, as did
the defendants in Goldfarb and Professional Engineers, that the quality of the professional
service that their members provide is enhanced by the price restraint.
Id at 2475.
14. See generally Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Industry, 12 AKRON L. REV. 417
(1979); Groseclose, Hospital Privilege Cases." Braving the Dismal Swamp, 26 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1981);
Halper, The Health Care Industy and the Antitrust Laws.- Colhsion Course?, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 17
(1980); Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry. New Warriors Into an Old Battle, 23 ST.
Louis U.LJ. 446 (1979). Weller, The Antitrust Swamp.- How Can Healthcare Professionals Avoid It?
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Oct. 1982, 26.
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tered by antitrust regulation. 15 In recent years, however, disputes between
physicians and hospitals over hospital privileges increasingly have been con-
sidered "in terms of their possible anticompetitive effect."' 6 In fact, recent
antitrust challenges to activities in the health care industry are recognized as
dominating a growing number of antitrust cases and have prompted sugges-
tions that the trend toward antitrust law enforcement in the health care in-
dustry will grow.' 7 Significantly, competition among physicians has been
exacerbated by the increasing number of medical school graduates entering
the health care field,' 8 the spiraling cost of health care, and pressures for a
more efficient health care delivery system.' 9
As physicians become more competitive,2 0 the endorsement conferred
by hospital privileges and hospital referral lists gains importance to doc-
tors. 2' Hospital policies which exclude some physicians but sanction others
may legitimately promote quality medical care, but those policies based
solely on thwarting competition will not go unchallenged. Courts are being
asked to consider the possible anticompetitive effects of staffing decisions
that hospitals once considered to be within their exclusive realm. 2 2 One po-
tential anticompetitive practice stems from a hospital's use of referral lists.
Referral lists contain the names of physicians who are recommended to
treat the specialized needs of hospital emergency room or clinic patients. In
theory, a referral list serves to channel patients only to those physicians sanc-
tioned by the hospital. 23 The Sherman Act 24 offers the remedial measure of
15. Rich, Medical StaffPrwvileges andAntitrust Laws, 2 WHITTIER L. REv. 667 (1980). See also
Goldsmith & Bertolet, The Present Status of hysician Privileges, 1981 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121.
16. Council of Medical Specialty Societies, EXECUTIVE REPORT, Dec. 1981.
17. As stated in a review of the United States Supreme Court's business law decisions dur-
ing its 1981-82 term: "Drugs and the medical profession received an unusual amount of atten-
tion . . . in the business-related decisions handed down by the 1981-82 U.S. Supreme Court.
Three of the six major antitrust decisions, for example, dealt with the health-care industry." 51
U.S.L.W. 3109 (Aug. 24, 1982). See also Federal Antitnst Regulations' Effects on Medicine Seen Grow-
ing, AMER. MED. NEWS, Oct. 9, 1981, at 12, col. 1; Meadows, Bold Departures in Antitrust, FOR-
TUNE, Oct. 5, 1981, 180-88.
18. US Report Projects Oversuppy of Doctors by 1990, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1980, at A16, col.
1.
19. "The classical model of collegial physician control over health care delivery is being
replaced rapidly by a view of health care providers (institutional as well as individual) as intense
competitors for a limited health care dollar." Norris & Szabo, Communicaton Between the Antitrust
and the Health Law Bars: Appeals for More Effective Dialogue and a New Rule of Reason, 7 AM. J.L. &
MED. i, ii (1981). See also Lave & Lave, Medical Care and Its Delivery: An Economic Appraisal, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 252 (1970).
20. "The prime reason for the increased competition among doctors is a 31% surge in their
numbers, to 437,000 from 334,000 between 1970 and 1978, a period when the population grew
by only 6.4%." Levin, Doctors Sue Hospitalsfor Staff Privileges as Competition Rises, Wall St. J., Sept.
29, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
21. "[I]t has become increasingly necessary for physicians to obtain and retain staff privi-
leges with at least one hospital in order to survive professionally." Goldsmith & Bertolet, supra
note 15, at 121.
22. Calvani & James, Antitrust Law and the Practice afMedine, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 75 (1980).
23. Hospital staff privileges permit a physician to practice medicine at the hospital, while
referral lists contain names of some, but perhaps not all, of the physicians who have been
awarded staff privileges.
For a discussion of tactics physicians may use to thwart competition among themselves, see
Note, Application of the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive Activities by Physicians, 30 RUTGERS L. REv.
991, 1006-09 (1977).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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treble damages to physicians who believe that the omission of their names
from referral lists unreasonably restrains competition. It was in this setting
that the case of Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hospital Systems 25 arose.
In Mish/er, Denver neurosurgeon Alan J. Mishler believed that his emer-
gency neurosurgery practice had been restrained by a local hospital, which
excluded his name from its referral list. The neurosurgeon filed suit against
one of the region's largest trauma hospitals and its emergency room direc-
tor,26 alleging that the defendants had conspired to destroy competition
2 7
and to monopolize 28 neurosurgery in Colorado and nearby states.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, con-
cluding that the neurosurgeon had failed to establish that the alleged con-
spiracy diminished interstate commerce. 29 Therefore, the lower court held,
the challenged activities did not invoke the federal antitrust laws.
B. Local Bustness Actilities, Interstate Commerce, and the Required Nexus
Since the expansion of the commerce power in the 1940's, it has been
difficult for most businesses, including community-oriented ones, to escape
the reach of the Sherman Act.30 The Supreme Court has expressed a liberal
policy in determining Sherman Act jurisdiction. "[I]f it is interstate com-
merce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which
25. [1981-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,342 (10th Cir. 1981).
26. Id. at 74,585.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This key section of the Sherman Act, which remains substan-
tially unchanged since its enactment in 1890, requires concerted activity between two or more
persons before a restraint on trade can be found. Section I provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be guilty of a
felony ....
28. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 defines three separate crimes: monopolization, combi-
nation and conspiracy to monopolize, and attempts to monopolize. The distinction between
section 1 and section 2 is that section 1 requires concerted action, whereas section 2 may be
violated unilaterally.
Section 2 provides: "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ....
29. [1981-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) [ 64,342, at 74,585 (10th Cir. 1981).
30. Congress had a narrow view of its power under the commerce clause when it passed the
Sherman Act in 1890. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1890).
The Supreme Court shared the view that the power underlying the commerce clause was
limited. In the first antitrust case considered by the Supreme Court, United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Court narrowly interpreted the term "interstate commerce"
by ruling that manufacturing did not impinge upon interstate commerce activities. In that
decision, the Court found that a monopoly of the sugar refining industry related only to local
manufacturing activities and therefore was not subject to the Sherman Act, despite the refiner's
importation of raw materials and shipment of sugar out of state. This decision was overruled by
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
The limited construction of interstate commerce was put to rest in Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942). The Court expanded its interpretation of interstate commerce by finding that
raising wheat, even though intended for the farm family's consumption, was within the congres-
sional commerce power because it affected the wheat supply and distribution throughout the
nation.
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applies the squeeze." 3 1 Hospitals, which primarily serve intrastate needs,
have now fallen within the ambit of antitrust regulations because of this
judicial enlargement of the commerce power.
32
Historically, hospitals have been labelled "local" businesses having an
insignificant impact on. interstate commerce. Without a significant nexus
with interstate commerce to trigger federal antitrust jurisdiction, hospitals
have not fallen prey to the scrutiny of federal antitrust statutes. As a result,
until 1976, most courts had refused to find an implicating nexus between
interstate commerce and hospital decisions regarding staff privileges. 33 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals acquiesced in this national hesitancy to in-
voke the commerce connection when it held that the decision by two
Oklahoma hospitals to deny staff privileges had a mere "insubstantial effect
upon interstate commerce." '34 But a year later, the United States Supreme
Court in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital35 relaxed the showing
of "substantial effects" on interstate commerce which the Tenth Circuit and
other federal appellate panels had required for jurisdiction in medical anti-
trust cases.
36
In its ruling in Hospital Building, the Supreme Court pointed out that
the local acts of the hospital may have a substantial effect upon interstate
commerce for the purpose of establishing federal antitrust jurisdiction.
37
31. United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
32. See Fried & Rabinowitz, Antitrut May Pose New Legal Issues for Hospitals, HOSPITALS,
June 1, 1982, at 66. See also supra note 14.
The commerce power is found in the U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. An antitrust plaintiff
may establish the necessary connection with interstate commerce in one of two ways: by dem-
onstrating that the challenged anticompetitive activity occurred in interstate commerce or by
showing that the activity, although wholly intrastate, had a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
33. The Supreme Court skirted the issue of whether professional services such as the prac-
tice of medicine fell under the umbrella of "trade or commerce." In 1952, the Court endorsed a
district court's conclusion that the sale of medical services did not fall within the scope of trade
or commerce of the Sherman Act. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326
(1952). For other decisions which denied relief under the antitrust laws for lack of a "substan-
tial effect" on interstate commerce in the health care industry, see Riggall v. Washington
County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958); Spears
Free Clinic and Hosp. v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952); Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Rich-
ardson, 167 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Ark. 1958), afd, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884 (1959). But see Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
34. Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684, 687 (10th
Cir. 1975). See also Note, The Medtcal Profession and the Sherman Act.- Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episco-
pal-Memorial Medical Center, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 196.
35. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
36. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical
Center, 513 F.2d 684, 687 (10th Cir. 1975) ruled that allegedly illegal conduct must have a
substantial effect upon interstate commerce to invoke federal jurisdiction under the antitrust
laws. This decision conformed with earlier pronouncements by the court that "[t]o come within
the purview of the Sherman Act the restraint of commerce or the obstruction of commerce must
be direct and substantial and not merely indirect or remote." Spears Free Clinic and Hosp. v.
Cleere, 197 F.2d 125, 126 (10th Cir. 1952). The Supreme Court upheld the "substantial effects"
test in Hospital Building, but relaxed the criteria necessary to establish substantial effects. Thus,
both Wolf and Spears Free Clinic followed prior decisions which rejected arguments that an alle-
gation that antitrust activities reduced the flow of patients from out-of-state could meet the
"substantial effects" test. The Court, however, in Hospital Building looked to that very factor in
finding that the defendants' activities had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
37. The Court held that a local hospital could complain of efforts made by the defendants
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The decision in Hospital Building set the tone for courts to extend the reach of
the Sherman Act to hospital activities. Despite federal court opinions to the
contrary, 38 the Supreme Court in Hospital Building decided that the plaintiff
had shown a substantial connection with interstate commerce even if no re-
straints purposely directed towards interstate commerce were shown. 39 The
Court was satisfied that a sufficient contact with interstate commerce existed
through allegations that the hospital purchased eighty percent of its supplies
outside the state, treated a "substantial" number of out-of-state patients, re-
ceived significant revenues from out-of-state insurance companies and fed-
eral health programs, and was financially tied to an out-of-state parent
corporation and a lending institution.
40
The elimination of the "direct and purposeful" effects test on interstate
commerce was reinforced by the Court's decision four years later in McLain v.
Real Estate Board.4 1 In McLain, the Court concluded that purely local busi-
ness restraints invoked the Sherman Act's jurisdiction. 42 This holding seem-
ingly rejected the narrower view that the alleged violation itself must impact
interstate commerce, and suggested that Sherman Act jurisdiction could be
invoked if the defendant's general business activities had an effect upon in-
terstate commerce. 43 The McLain decision paved the way for a Tenth Cir-
cuit reversal on rehearing en banc of its initial decision in Crane v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 44 denying Sherman Act jurisdiction for alleged
antitrust violations similar to those complained of by Dr. Mishler.
In Crane, a pathologist alleged that the defendants had restrained his
practice at a hospital they owned. A Tenth Circuit three-judge panel origi-
nally held that the complaint did not invoke antitrust jurisdiction because of
its failure to show the substantial effect of the defendants' activities on inter-
state commerce.45 In light of McLain, 46 the en banc review of Crane found
jurisdiction anchored in the defendants' activities, which paralleled those
to block the hospital's expansion. The district court had dismissed the hospital's complaint on
jurisdictional grounds and the dismissal was upheld by the Fourth Circuit. Hospital Bldg. Co.
v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
38. Set supra note 33.
39. 425 U.S. at 745.
40. Id at 741.
41. 444 U.S. 232, 242, 246 (1980).
42. The interstate effect on activities was not obvious in MLan. The plaintiffs charged
that the local real estate brokers had conspired to fix prices on the purchase and sale of homes
by an agreement to honor established brokerage commissioned rates. The Court found suffi-
cient effect on interstate commerce because "[u]ltimately, whatever stimulates or retards the
volume of residential sales, or has an impact on the purchase price, affects the demand for
financing and title insurance, those two commercial activities . . . are shown to have occurred
in interstate commerce." 444 U.S. at 246.
The Court accepted as an indication of interstate activities the affidavits that out-of-state
depositors backed local lending institutions who, in turn, financed the sales of local homes; that
mortgages were often insured by federal programs; and that many mortgages were conditioned
on title insurance furnished by interstate corporations.
43. 444 U.S. at 244-45.
44. 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980) (Breitenstein, J.), rev'don reh'g en bane, 637 F.2d 715, 719
(10th Cir. 1981) (Seymour, J.).
45. 637 F.2d at 718. The Tenth Circuit followed its reasoning used in Wolf v. Jane Phillips
Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1975). See supra text accompany-
ing note 34. For a more complete discussion of Crane, see Antitrust, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey, 59 DEN. L.J. 221-23 (1982).
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that had also established the requisite effect on interstate commerce in Hospi-
tal Building.4 7 Receiving medical insurance from out-of-state, treating out-
of-state patients, and buying supplies from out-of-state companies "ade-
quately [met] McLain's call for identification of relevant channels of inter-
state commerce and their relationship to the challenged activities."'4 3 The
Tenth Circuit continued to maintain in Crane that the plaintiff was required
to demonstrate not that the defendants' general business activities had a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce, but that the allegedly illegal activities
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
49
The Tenth Circuit in Mishler, more attuned than in Crane to the ease
with which the Supreme Court established interstate commerce connections,
permitted Dr. Mishler to proceed with his antitrust claim. The suit alleged
that interstate commerce resulted from the defendants' out-of-state medical
insurance payments, out-of-state supply purchases, and treatment of out-of-
state patients.
50
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's requirement that
the alleged conspiracy must diminish interstate commerce 5' and instead
pinned antitrust jurisdiction to a more provable allegation: the hospital's
illegal activity had occurred within the flow of interstate commerce or had
substantially affected interstate commerce. 52 In its reversal and remand to
the trial court, the Tenth Circuit displayed sensitivity to the language of the
Supreme Court's most recent expansion of Sherman Act jurisdiction through
McLain.
The appellate court in Mishler found that "although Dr. Mishler must
eventually prove a not insubstantial effect on interstate commerce," his com-
plaint had met the requirements of merely identifying the "relevant chan-
nels of interstate commerce and their relationship to the challenged
activities."'53 In remanding the case, the court noted that "even at trial, Dr.
Mishler [was] not required to show that the flow of interstate commerce
[was] diminished; an unreasonable burden on commerce may exist even
though the anticompetitive conduct may increase interstate commerce."
54
In so holding, the court again maintained that the allegedly illegal activities,
rather than the defendants' overall business activity, must substantially af-
46. The Supreme Court decided McLain on the same day the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed
the dismissal of Dr. Crane's complaint. Crane, 637 F.2d at 720.
47. Id at 725 (citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 741
(1976)).
48. 637 F.2d at 725.
49. Id at 723-24.
50. Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Sys., [1981-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 64,342, at 74,586
(10th Cir. 1981).
51. Id at 74,585.
52. Id at 74,586 (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980)).
53. [1981-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 74,586.
54. Id. (citing Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Markets, Inc., 587 F.2d 127, 132 & n. 14
(3d Cir. 1978); P. MARCUS, ANTITRUST LAw AND PRACTICE 86 (1980)).
After winning the appeal, the plaintiff decided not to return his case to the trial court.
Telephone interview with Sidney W. DeLong, attorney for the plaintiff-appellant Dr. Mishler





Judge Holloway concurred in the opinion but took issue with the rea-
soning used by the court. He noted that the en banc opinion of Crane had
misconstrued the jurisdictional showing required to establish antitrust au-
thority.56 Judge Holloway urged the court to consider the nature of the
defendants' overall business activities, rather than the unlawful conduct of
the defendants' activities, to establish the jurisdictional showing.
57 Although
Judge Holloway agreed that Dr. Mishler's complaint should not have been
dismissed by the lower court, he stated that the Tenth Circuit had deviated
from the intent of McLain by requiring a jurisdictional "showing that the
unlawful conduct itself had an effect on interstate commerce." '58 Commen-
tators, however, have criticized this broad interpretation of McLai'n, under
which a defendant's overall business activities, rather than the challenged
conduct, would be sufficient to invoke federal antitrust jurisdiction if the
activities bore a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
59
The impact of the extension of the Sherman Act to hospitals, which in
the past were shielded from federal antitrust enforcement because of their
"local" or intrastate activities, serves as a warning that the "threat of this
kind of litigation must not be overlooked." 6 The antitrust implications of
the expanded jurisdictional authority resulting from McLain have caused
confusion among the circuits.6 ' A federal judge who presided over a six-year
legal battle between a cardiothoracic surgeon and the Pennsylvania hospital
55. [1981-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) at 74,586.
56. Id (Holloway, J., concurring).
57. Id. (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980)).
58. Id (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980)).
59. "Unfortunately, there also is language in McLain which suggests that a plaintiff need
only show that a defendant's total activities, independent of the alleged violation, have a sub-
stantial effect upon interstate commerce-if that language is read outside the context of the full
opinion." Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitst and Hospital Poileges: Testing the Con-
ventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 632 (1982).
The result of such a broad interpretation of McLain would eliminate the interstate com-
merce test from federal antitrust law, according to critics, because virtually all activities, no
matter how local, are likely to have effects on interstate commerce. Id at 632-33.
A number of lower courts have followed the broad interpretation advocated by Judge Hol-
loway. See Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980); Western Waste Serv. Sys.
v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir.), cert. denid, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Feldman
v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 509 F. Supp. 815 (S.D. Fla. 1981). The Tenth Circuit has been
consistent in its position that such a broad reading of McLain is improper.
60. Kopit, Gerson & Moses, Hospitals Must Consider Antitrust Implications of Multi-Institutional
Arrangements, 82 HOSPITALS, Mar. 1, 1982.
Antitrust litigation can be long and costly. This is particularly true because the re-
sponsible officers and directors may be subject to civil or criminal liability as a result of
a corporation's anticompetitive activities. The prevailing party might be awarded its
attorney fees, and the amount of the actual damages is tripled in settlements under the
antitrust laws.
Id at 1.
61. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have upheld the dismissal of hospital privilege antitrust
suits on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to meet the interstate commerce requirement. See
Capili v. Shott, 620 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1980); Moles v. Morton F. Plant Hosp., Inc., 617 F.2d
293 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
In Cardio-Medical Assoc. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Pa.
1982), a federal court held that a physician could not establish antitrust jurisdiction by alleging
the hospital had interstate activities. The court rejected the allegation that the hospital's overall
business had a substantial effect on commerce. It also noted that any implied allegation involv-
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that denied him staff privileges said that "Congress did not pass the antitrust
laws in order to ensure that every young surgeon can perform the type and
number of procedures that he considers to be most satisfying."
62
The implication in the Tenth Circuit is that many businesses, once con-
sidered local in nature, will now be vulnerable to antitrust challenges by
plaintiffs whose requisite showing of "substantial effects" on interstate com-
merce is now an easier burden of proof. The impact could be far-reaching
on antitrust defendants because nearly all businesses have some tangential
involvement in interstate commerce. But a more somber message may be
the one suggested by an antitrust scholar who has questioned that "with
interstate connections so readily found, is the insistence upon 'substantial
and adverse' interstate effects . . . but [a] meaningless charade?"
6 3
II. NEw APPLICATION FOR ILLINOIS BRICK
A. Indirect Sellers Equated to Indirect Purchasers
The Tenth Circuit seized an opportunity to extend a recent Supreme
Court doctrine in the appellate court's review of a class action brought by
wheat farmers in Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico. In Ziznser v. Continental
Grain Company,64 the wheat producers claimed six large grain exporters and a
former Department of Agriculture official violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 65 and sought relief under sections 4 and 12 of the Clayton
Act.6 6 The lawsuits arose from the so called "great grain robbery" involving
ing the payment of patients' medical bills by out-of-state insurance companies and the federal
government would be insufficient grounds to invoke the Sherman Act.
Other courts have embraced the more relaxed interstate commerce test used by the Tenth
Circuit in MirAler. See McDonald v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 524 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Ga. 1981);
Malini v. Singleton & Assoc., 516 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Feldman v. Jackson Memorial
Hosp., 509 F. Supp. 815 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Denver v. Santa Barbara Comm. Dialysis Center,
[1981-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,946 (C.D. Cal. 1981). See also Everhart v. Jane C. Stormont
Hosp., [1982-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,703 (D. Kan. 1982) in which the court relied on the
Tenth Circuit's opinions in Mtshler and in Crane upon the rehearing en banc to find that a
cardiologist who claimed he was denied staff privileges at three Kansas hospitals had alleged
sufficient interstate commerce connections.
62. Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 891 (W.D. Pa. 1981). In Robinson the district
court refused to dismiss the surgeon's antitrust suit against a hospital and a group of cardi-
othoracic surgeons on the basis that the complaint failed to establish the interstate commerce
connection. Id. at 876-77. Yet, the court ultimately held that the hospital had legitimate com-
petitive goals which created valid reasons for preferring certain surgeons over others. Id. at 923-
24.
63. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 133 (3d ed. 1980).
64. 660 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982).
65. See supra notes 27 and 28.
66. Private antitrust actions are brought under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). It provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides. . . without respect to the amount
in controversy and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained in the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The court may award. . . simple inter-
est on actual damages ....
Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976) permits venue in suit against a corpo-
ration in a district in which the corporation is not subject to service of process. It provides:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be
brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
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the sale of over one billion dollars of United States wheat to the Soviet
Union in 1972.67
Edgar W. Cleveland, an Altus, Oklahoma wheat farmer, sought $150
million in damages in the first of three class action suits which listed Conti-
nental Grain Company and its vice president, former Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture, Clarence Palmby, as defendants. 68 Two other farmers, Joe
Zinser of Texas and John Spearman of New Mexico, filed similar class ac-
tion suits which were later consolidated with Cleveland's by order of the
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation.
69
Cleveland's suit alleged that Palmby conspired with Continental Grain
Company and five other large grain companies to suppress the news of an
impending wheat sale to the Russians. 70 As a result, wheat farmers con-
tended that they sold their grain at prices lower than wheat would have
commanded had the public known about the Russian wheat deal. 71  The
suit charged that Palmby knew when he went to the Soviet Union in 1972 to
negotiate terms for the wheat sale that he was going to leave the agriculture
department for a job with Continental Grain Company.7 2 In subsequent
hearings before the House Livestock and Grain Subcommittee, Palmby re-
futed any conflict of interest and denied that agriculture department officials
had leaked information to Continental enabling the grain company to cover
the Russian orders before a rise in the domestic wheat price.
7 3
The investigation into Palmby "simply faded away for lack of evi-
dence, ' ' 74 but the wheat farmers were not dissuaded from pursuing their
claim under the expansive remedial treble damages provision of the antitrust
laws. 75 During discovery, however, a fatal flaw in the class action suits was
disclosed.
Most of the class members in the suit had sold their wheat to "middle-
district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases
may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
67. Langway & Gram, The Big Five, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 1975, at 59.
68. Continental Grain Got Soviet Wheat Order 3 Days Before the US-Russia Grain Accord, Wall St.
J., Sept. 20, 1972, at 2, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Continental Grain Order].
69. In re Wheat Farmers' Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 366 F. Supp. 1087 (J.P.M.D.L.
1973). The three class action suits were:
Cleveland v. Palmby, in which named plaintiff Edgar W. Cleveland represented a class of
approximately 43,000 Oklahoma wheat farmers. In addition to Continental and Palmby, five
other grain companies were named as defendants.
Zinser v. Palmby, in which named plaintiff Joe Zinser represented a class of approximately
12,000 wheat farmers in 34 counties in the Panhandle and northern Texas.
Spearman v. Palmby, in which named plaintiffJohn Spearman represented between 600
and 1,500 wheat farmers in Curry County, New Mexico.
Continental Grain Co. and Palmby were named as defendants in all three suits.
70. Continental Grain Order, supra note 68, at 2.
71. Id.
72. Oklahoma Farmer Sues 6 Firmsfor 1150 Million in Russian Wheat Sale, Wall St. J., Oct. 25,
1972, at 4, col. 2.
73. Askey, Conflict-of-Interest Laws Face Review in Grain Deal, Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 16,
1972, at 4, col. 3.
74. Id
75. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) refers to antitrust laws which include the Sher-




men" such as farmer-owned cooperatives and county grain elevators. Those
middlemen, in turn, sold the grain either to one of the defendant companies
or to someone else in the distribution chain.76 Documents obtained during
the discovery process showed that very few wheat farmers had dealt directly
with the named defendants in their suits. For example, the trial court found
that less than 100 farmers among the 43,000 Oklahoma wheat producers
represented in the Cleveland suit sold directly to Continental Grain Com-
pany. Only 212 of the 12,000 farmers represented in Zinser's suit and sixty-
two members of the Spearman class of between 600 and 1,500 New Mexico
farmers dealt directly with the company.
77
The wheat farmers' nine-year litigation was punctuated by a Supreme
Court decision which diminished the possibility of recovery by the wheat
producers. Illinois Brick Co. v. Ilhinois78 precluded the claims of indirect pur-
chasers, those who bought from middlemen rather than directly from the
named defendants.
For many antitrust law scholars, llinois Brick came as no surprise. In
light of the Court's unanimous decision nearly a decade earlier in Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machiney Corp. 79 the Court in Illinois BrIck either had
to approve or overrule Hanover's rejection of the defensive pass-on theory for
illegal overcharges to indirect purchasers. 80
In Hanover Shoe, the plaintiff shoe manufacturer alleged the defendant's
lease arrangement of its shoe manufacturing equipment created a monopoly
which resulted in illegal "overcharges.""' In defense, the defendant United
Shoe Machinery (United) asserted that Hanover Shoe suffered no legal in-
jury because it had passed on the illegal overcharges to shoe customers.
8 2
The thrust of United's argument was that indirect purchasers, rather than
direct purchasers, had been injured, and that Hanover Shoe could not re-
cover for their injury. The Court rejected this defense, but was faced with
the flip side of the argument in Ilhnois Brick.
The plaintiffs in Illinois Brick included the state of Illinois and 700 local
municipalities who sued a concrete block manufacturer. s 3 The plaintiffs did
not buy the concrete blocks directly from the manufacturer, but purchased
them through building contractors once the blocks were incorporated into
76. Zinser, 660 F.2d at 757.
77. Id at 758.
78. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
79. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). This case resulted from the lease system United Shoe Machinery
Corp. (United) used in marketing its shoe manufacturing equipment. Hanover Shoes, Inc.
(Hanover) brought an antitrust action for treble damages against United. Hanover claimed
that United leased, but refused to sell, its shoe manufacturing equipment to Hanover. Hanover
alleged the lease arrangement created a monopoly and, in addition, an illegal overcharge re-
sulted from the difference between what Hanover paid for its machine rentals and what it
would have paid had United been willing to sell its machines.
80. The Court decided to accept Hanover because to set it aside would "cut back or aban-
don" precedent and thus forget the hallowed doctrine of stare decisis in the "area of statutory
construction where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation." 431
U.S. at 736.
81. 392 U.S. at 483-84.
82. Id at 488.
83. 431 US. at 726
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the masonry structure.8 4 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had fixed
prices and as a result, illegal overcharges were passed on through the middle-
men for the plaintiffs to bear.
85
The Supreme Court held that, having rejected the defensive use of the
pass-on theory of illegal overcharges in Hanover Shoe, it was required to reject
the plaintiffs' effort to invoke the pass-on theory offensively.8 6 The Court
ruled that direct purchasers may have had a cause of action, but the plain-
tiffs, as indirect purchasers, did not.
8 7
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, relying on the
Supreme Court's analysis in Illinois Brick, laid to rest any notion of recovery
by the wheat farmers, who were by then considered "indirect" sellers. 88 The
three class representatives, Cleveland, Zinser, and Spearman, had not sold
wheat directly to any of the defendants. In fact, not more than 366 farmers
in all three classes had direct dealings with the defendants.8 9 The trial court
dismissed the actions "without prejudice." 90
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether
the principles of Illinois Brick were properly applied to indirect sellers in the
wheat farmers' suits. Judge McWilliams, writing for the court, traced the
progeny of Hanover Shoe9 1 and concluded that "[f]rom Ilh'nois Brick, we
learn[ed] that in an antitrust treble damage case involving price-fixing the
plaintiff must have dealt directly with the alleged violator."'9 2 Although the
plaintiff farmers were indirect sellers, and not indirect purchasers as in Illinois
Brick, the court found that this distinction did not preclude application of
the Illinois Brick rule to the wheat farmers' allegations that the depressed
wheat prices were passed along by middlemen.
93
The Tenth Circuit found support for its position in the Fifth Circuit,
which had applied the general rule of Ilhnois Brick to a situation similar to
84. Id
85. Id at 727.
86. Id at 730-46.
One of the major concerns expressed by the Court was the difficulty in tracing damages.
The Court believed the judiciary would face an insurmountable task if called upon to trace and
apportion damages. Id at 740-41. Another concern was the possibility of duplicate recovery by
exposing the antitrust defendant to treble damage suits instigated by a multitude of both indi-
rect and direct purchaser plaintiffs. Id at 730-31.
87. Id at 746-47. The private treble damage actions brought by masonry contractors, gen-
eral contractors, and private builders ultimately were settled. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536
F.2d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1976).
88. Zinser, 660 F.2d at 758.
89. Id
90. The trial court later amended its order to provide that the claims of all members who
did not sell directly to any defendant were dismissed with prejudice, and that the claims of those
who did sell directly to a defendant were dismissed without prejudice. Id at 759.
The Tenth Circuit court considered the appeal of a second group of wheat farmers seeking
class action certification in In re Wheat Farmers Antitrust Class Action Litigation No. II, No.
81-1745 (10th Cir. Sept. 3, 1981). The wheat producers appealed the district court's refusal to
certify their cases as class actions pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The Tenth Circuit dismissed
the appeal and held that the district court's order denying certification to the plaintiffs was
neither final nor appealable. In re Wheat Farmers', No. 81-1745, slip op. at 4.
91. Zinser, 660 F.2d at 759.




that of the wheat farmers. In re Beef Industyr Antitrust Litigation94 was a suit in
which cattlemen alleged that retail food chains had conspired to depress the
prices they paid to meat packers for beef, with the packers presumably pass-
ing those lower prices back to the cattlemen. The Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiff sellers, who were ranchers or cattle feeders, had no right to recover
in an antitrust action against the defendant retail food chains unless the
plaintiffs had dealt directly with the food chains. 95
The line of cases upon which the Tenth Circuit relied to preclude the
wheat farmers' recovery has been criticized as displaying insensitivity by per-
mitting the wrong people to recover damages.9 6 Legislation to overrule the
Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick has been introduced, but has
failed. 97
The "bizarre result" of llfinois Brick and its progeny, as one commenta-
tor has suggested, is that the direct purchaser or seller of a monopolist may
have a cause of action to sue for the monopolist's under- or overcharge, while
the consumer who actually bears the brunt of that illegal charge has no right
of recovery. 98 This rule, if used to insulate the monopolist, would be an
94. 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Meat Price
Investigators Ass'n, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
95. Although the ranchers in In re BeefIndustry Antitrust Litatton were permitted to recover
damages because they fell within a narrow exception to Illinois Brck4, no such exception was
found in the wheat growers' case. That exception recognized that if the plaintiffs had a pre-
existing cost-plus contract with the middlemen, then the plaintiffs would have a cause of action
against the defendants with whom they had had no direct dealings. The exception was first
recognized in Hanover Shoe where there was "an overcharged buyer [who] has a pre-existing
'cost-plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged .. .." Hano-
ver Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). The Court in llinois Brick
mentioned that another exception might be permitted where the direct purchaser is owned or
controlled by its customer. 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.
The pre-existing cost-plus contract found by the Fifth Circuit arose from the practice of the
middlemen, the meat packers, applying a set formula to a "Yellow Sheet" reflecting the defend-
ants' wholesale beef prices. This formula determined the price meat packers would pay the
plaintiffs for their cattle. The Tenth Circuit found no comparable cost-plus contract to enable
it to find that the wheat producers fell within an exception to the application of the Illinois Brick
rule.
The Tenth Circuit indicated that it could apply exceptions to Illinois Brick sparingly:
"[E]xceptions to Illinois Brick are exceedingly narrow in scope, and we believe, should be few in
number. . . . [A]ny exception should not be given an expansive application, lest it swallow the
rule and become the rule itself." Zinser, 660 F.2d at 761.
96. See, e.g., Carrafiello, A Search for Symmet1r. The "Pass-on "Issue in Quest of Determination, 24
ANTITRUST BULL. 187 (1979); Watson, Bad Economics in the Antitrust Courtroom: Illinois Brick and
the Stngle "Pass-on" Problem, 9, No. 4 ANTITRUST L. & EcON. REV. 69 (1977).
97. A bill that would permit indirect purchasers to sue for antitrust damages was backed
by consumer groups and introduced as S. 598, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). The bill was re-
ported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee by a bare nine-to-eight margin, but failed on the
floor. Legislative attempts to overturn Illinois Brick have continued, but to this date have not
been successful. The main criticism of the proposed legislation is that it would burden the
courts and possibly result in double liability for defendants.
98. Watson, supra note 96, at 76. But see Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621
F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980) (Ilhnois Brick's concern with possible multiple damage recovery against
price-fixers did not bar suit for treble damages by printing company against manufacturer
where "middleman" was the wholesaling division of another manufacturer); Fontana Aviation,
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980). (Illinois Brick did not apply where
manufacturer and middlemen were both alleged to be co-conspirators in a common illegal en-
terprise with intended injury to buyer); Dart Drug Corp. v. Corning Glass Works, 480 F. Supp.
1091 (D. Md. 1979). (Illinois Brick did not bar recovery, even though plaintiff was not a direct
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anathema to the intent of antitrust laws, enacted to combat the inequities
resulting when farmers, shippers, and other suppliers have been overcharged
and underpaid. 99 However, in opting to stand firmly with Illinois Brick in
the wheat farmers' suit, the Tenth Circuit has maintained a policy consistent
with that expressed in Illinois Brick, thereby recognizing and addressing the
concerns expressed by the Supreme Court.
III. THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
In Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo,1° ° the court declined to
impose antitrust liability on the defendant because of a state statute which
set forth state policy regarding municipal operation of airports, thereby im-
munizing the municipality against antitrust claims regarding that opera-
tion.' The court, in affirming the district court's grant of the city of
Pueblo's motion for summary judgment, paid particular attention to the
Supreme Court's reversal of its decision in Community Communications Co., Inc.
v. City of Boulder.
102
In Pueblo Aircraft, the city of Pueblo had assumed the exclusive responsi-
bility for the local airport and its operation, including the maintenance of
hangars and storage of aviation fuel, after acquiring the facility from the
federal government in 1948. The plaintiff, Pueblo Aircraft, ran an aviation
refueling, repairing, and storage business, called a fixed-base operation, at
the city-owned airport. When Pueblo Aircraft's lease at Pueblo's municipal
airport expired, the city awarded the bid for the lease to another fixed-base
operator. Pueblo Aircraft filed suit against the city under section 1 of the
Sherman Act103 and section 3 of the Clayton Act,' ° 4 alleging that the city
purchaser from the manufacturer. The court permitted recovery because the plaintiffs injury
was not based on any overcharge that had been passed on to it by entities between it and the
manufacturer).
99. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 143-44 (1955).
100. 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 762 (1983).
101. COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-4-101 (1973) provides:
The acquisition of any lands for the purpose of establishing airports or other air navi-
gation facilities; the acquisition of airport protection privileges; the acquisition, estab-
lishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, and
operation of airports and other air navigation facilities; and the exercise of any other
powers granted in this part I to any county, city and county, city or town are hereby
declared to be public governmental functions. . . for a public purpose, and matters of
public necessity; and such lands and other property, easements, and privileges ac-
quired and used in the manner and for the purposes enumerated in this part I are
hereby declared to be acquired and used for public purposes and as a matter of public
necessity.
102. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). See supra note 5.
103. See supra note 27.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). This section is explicitly limited to exclusive dealing restraints
upon customers by suppliers. It provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce. . to lease or make a sale
or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities . . . for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . . or fix a
price charge therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition,
agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal
in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a com-
petitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
ANTITRUST
violated antitrust laws by stipulating in its lease agreement with the fixed-
base operators that they buy aviation fuel from the city.
The district court found that Pueblo's home rule status 0 5 exempted it
from antitrust law as a result of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion
in Community Communications Co. 106 That decision held that the constitutional
delegation of powers to the city in local matters through its home rule status
conferred the status of state action on a Boulder ordinance.
Nevertheless, as if divining that the Supreme Court would poke a hole
in the Tenth Circuit's ruling, the district court "alternatively relied on a
specific statutory authorization granted to the city as a further ground for its
immunity determination."'' 0 7 This alternative rationale relieved the appel-
late panel from re-engaging in the analysis it had undertaken a year earlier
in Communit Communications Co. in order to conclude that the municipality
had license to avoid antitrust penalty.
The tenor of the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Pueblo Aircraft suggested a
paternalistic approach towards the right of local municipalities to manage
their own affairs unencumbered by federal intervention. The enabling legis-
lation found in the Colorado statute 0 8 gave the Tenth Circuit the modicum
of comfort it needed to find that Pueblo's actions were immune from anti-
trust intervention, yet in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Community Communications Co.
The key distinction between the Pueblo Aircraft permitted activity and
the illegal one in Community Communications Co. was that Pueblo's operation of
its airport was in furtherance of a clearly articulated state policy,' 0 9 while
Boulder's ordinance was not. "o Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in
the five-to-three decision of Community Communications Co., said that for a mu-
nicipality to invoke antitrust immunity, the challenged activity must consti-
The allegation of this violation was intended to assail the city's lease agreement, which
required the fixed-based operators to purchase the aviation fuel they sold from the city. This
practice is commonly known as a tying arrangement.
105. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 gives cities in Colorado with a population of at least 2,000
people the power to adopt a charter authorizing the city to enact legislation in matters of local
concern. The constitution provides:
From and after the certifying to and filing with the secretary of state of a charter
framed and approved in reasonable conformity with the provisions of this article, such
city or town and the citizens thereof shall have. . . all other powers necessary, requi-
site or proper for the government and administration of its local and municipal mat-
ters .. ..
Id
106. Community Communications Co;, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). The appellate court held in Community Commvurnalions Co. that
the city of Boulder, which was a home rule city, had taken actions tantamount to the powers of
the state in Boulder's regulation of the cable television. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's
opinion in this case, see Antitrust, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 58 DEN. LJ. 249, 255-64
(1981).
107. Pueblo Aircraft, 679 F.2d at 807.
108. See supra note 101.
109. 679 F.2d at 808.
110. "The relationship of the [state of Colorado to Boulder's moratorium ordinance is one
of precise neutrality." Community Communcations Co., 455 U.S. at 55.
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tute the action of the state itself in its sovereign capacity, I tI or implement a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy."' 112
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the involvement of a govern-
mental agency is not automatically sufficient to trigger the state action im-
munity;" 3 rather, the courts must find that the state has stamped its
approval on the anticompetitive behavior through legislative authoriza-
tion. 14 Further, the existence of such state authorization and policy must
apparently be derived from statutes.1 1 5 The Tenth Circuit sanctioned
Pueblo's activities by reference to the statute's express declaration that the
operation of the airport facilities was "to be [a] public governmental [func-
tion], exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public necessity."' 16
The Tenth Circuit, reproved by the Supreme Court in Community Com-
municaltons Co. for relying on a state position "of mere neutrality respecting the
municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive," '" 7 emphasized the legisla-
tive ratification of Pueblo's airport operations activity. The Colorado statute
authorizing the operation of municipal airports provided the affirmatively
expressed state policy necessary to exempt Pueblo's actions from the federal
antitrust laws.
The clear impression left in the wake of Community Communications Co. is
that municipalities, in order to operate governmental business uninhibited
111. Id at 52 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
In Parker, the California Agricultural Proration Act mandated that raisin growers partici-
pate in a marketing scheme that appeared to violate the antitrust laws by maintaining prices
and restricting competition. The Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws were not intended
to reach activity required by the state. The Court noted that the legislative history of the Sher-
man Act contained no suggestion of Congress' intent to restrain state action; the Act was di-
rected towards individuals and corporations. The action of the state was held to be a valid act
of government. 317 U.S. at 350-52. Thus, the Parker defense protects individuals and associa-
tions that engage in anticompetitive conduct mandated by the state.
The defense may be invoked only where the restraining regulation has been promulgated
by the state action in its sovereign capacity; the mandate must be of an "active government."
The "state action" defense is inapplicable to ministerial regulation, that is, where the state is
acting in its advisory capacity. Whether a formal governmental approval reaches the level of a
state command is contingent upon the state's role in formulating the restraint, its interest
therein, and the nature of the state's action. There has long been debate over the precise scope
of this defense. See, e.g., Posner, The Proper Relationshop Between State Regulation and the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1974); Note, Federal Antitrust Policy v. State Anticompetitive
Regulaton: A Means Scrutiny Linit for Parker v. Brown, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 179.
112. 455 U.S. at 52; see City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978), which narrowed the ruling in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Lafayette, the
Court held that a city was a "person" covered by the antitrust laws and could be sued for treble
damages for violating antitrust laws in its operation of a municipal utility. The opinion indi-
cated that the doctrine of state action immunity does not exempt all governmental entities
simply by reason of their status as such. When the state itself has not directed or authorized an
anticompetitive practice, the state's subdivisions must obey the antitrust laws.
113. See supra note I11.
114. Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
115. Cf P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 130 (3d ed. 1980). Professor Areeda points out
that those statutes providing guidance for state authorization may be "far from explicit on the
point." Id.
116. Pueblo Aircraft, 679 F.2d at 811.
117. 455 U.S. at 55 (emphasis in original).
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by federal antitrust regulations, must be protected by virtue of express state
sanctions, such as statutory provisions. 18 The Tenth Circuit, sensitive to the
possibility that denial of antitrust immunity will impede cities in executing
local government programs and unduly burden federal courts, can likely be
expected to search state statutes for authorization of local government
activities.
IV. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ANTITRUST VIOLATORS
An issue of national interest in antitrust litigation is contribution among
antitrust defendants. The Tenth Circuit considered this question in a peti-
tion for rehearing en banc in Olson Farms, Inc. v. Countyside Farms, Inc. (Olson
II). 119 In its reconsideration of a decision rendered by a Tenth Circuit
panel nearly a year earlier, the appellate court followed the recent unani-
mous ruling by the Supreme Court, Texas Industries, Inc. v. RadcifMaterals,
Inc. ,120 which denied contribution among antitrust co-conspirators.
At common law, contribution among joint wrongdoers was not permit-
ted where the tort was an intentional one.1 2 ' Accordingly, a number of
lower federal courts have denied contribution among antitrust defendants
because Congress has not created a statute allowing recovery from co-con-
spirators. However, the Eighth Circuit in 1978 held that contribution was
118. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, dissented in
Communi y Communications Co. and said that the majority's decision will "impede, if not paralyze,
local governments' efforts to enact ordinances and regulations aimed at protecting public
health, safety, and welfare." Id at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist maintained
that the Court's ruling "effectively destroys the 'home rule' movement in this country, through
which local governments have obtained, not without persistent state opposition, a limited au-
tonomy over matters of local concern." Id at 71.
Sen. Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman, held a hearing on
June 30, 1982, to determine what, if any, legislative response was appropriate to the Supreme
Court's rejection of state action immunity for home rule municipalities after Community Communi
cations Co. Representatives of local government expressed concern that the uncertainties created
by Community Communications Co. would impede governmental policies and result in expensive
litigation.
William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, said the
Administration had not reached a conclusion that legislation would be an appropriate response
to local governments' concerns. Mr. Baxter said that when municipal conduct unreasonably
restrains commercial competition, there may be strong policies in favor of applying the antitrust
laws, absent a statewide policy to replace competition with regulation or monopoly public serv-
ice. The Justice Department would not seek criminal indictments against municipal officials
when the legality of their conduct was uncertain or openly undertaken without intent to violate
antitrust laws. 549 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 5-6 (July 6, 1982).
The concern that the Supreme Court's ruling would impede cities in executing local gov-
ernmental programs was addressed by a bill introduced into the Colorado Legislature which
would have exempted local governments from antitrust liability. H.B. 1238, 53d Gen. Assem-
bly, 2d Sess. (1982). This bill, along with H.R.J. Res. 1016, 53d Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1982),
introduced by Rep. Claire Traylor, R-Wheatridge, was postponed indefinitely.
119. No. 78-1773 (10th Cir., Nov. 8, 1979),petion on reh'g en bane (10th Cir., June 30, 1981).
120. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
121. See, e.g., Cirace, A Game Theoretic Anaysis of Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust
Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 42 (1980); Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribution
Among Antitrust Defendants.- A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J. L. & ECON. 331 (1980); Floyd,
Contribution Among Antitrust Violators. A Question of Legal Process , 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 183; Polin-
sky & Shavell, Contribution and Claim Redution Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33
STAN. L. REV. 447 (1981); Sullivan, New Perspectives in Antitrust Litigation: Towards a Right of
Comparattie Contribution, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 389.
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available in antitrust suits under certain circumstances.' 22 The Tenth and
Fifth Circuits have held otherwise.' 23 In Texas Industries, the Court found
that neither federal statutory law nor federal common law permitted it to
fashion a right of contribution. 124 The Tenth Circuit, following this reason-
ing, ruled in Olson II that in the absence of any statutory provision permit-
ting damages contribution in antitrust cases, the antitrust violator has no
right to seek contribution from alleged co-conspirators.1
25
The appeal in Olson II concerned the question of contribution for dam-
ages incurred as a result of continued antitrust violations. Olson If was a
companion case to Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (Olson ) .126 0 lson
Ii's appeal concerned the district court's dismissal of Olson Farm's cross-
claim against Egg Products Co., Snow White Egg Co., Countryside Farms,
Inc., and a third-party complaint against Safeway Stores, Inc., for contribu-
tion or indemnity. The Tenth Circuit, with Judge Holloway concurring
only in the denial of indemnity, found that an antitrust defendant cannot
obtain contribution towards treble damage liability, and as a result, the egg
distributor found to have conspired with other distributors to fix prices paid
to egg producers was not entitled to contribution from co-conspirators who
were not defendants.1
2 7
In the Olson I case, Olson Farms' role as an "intentional" tortfeasor dis-
couraged the court from creating a right to contribution. 28 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, in Olson I, in declining to fashion contribution rules, held that "the
Congress. . .is in a far superior and more appropriate position to gauge the
impact on observance and enforcement of the antitrust laws from contribu-
tion and its various facets of implementation."' 29 This year, the Senate has
122. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1979).
123. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979),
afdsub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); Olson Farms,
Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir. 1979). The federal
courts have recognized the fairness of the right to contribution in other areas of law and have
acted to permit such claims. See, e.g., Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S.
106, 111 (1974) (admirality); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) (federal tort
claim); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978
(1975) (aviation law).
In de Hass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), afdin part, rev'dtn
part on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970), the court allowed contribution among
intentional wrongdoers, although the statute did not specifically provide for it in this securities
case. The court expressed the opinion that there was a policy that contribution was part of the
regulatory framework of the securities laws, whether or not specifically stated in the statute.
124. 451 U.S. 630, 647 (1981).
125. No. 78-1773, slip op. at 3-4.
126. [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir. 1979). Olson Farms was found liable
for damages, but only an injunction was issued against another co-defendant, Oakdell Egg
Farms, Inc. The jury verdict was affirmed in Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541
F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
In Olson I, an antitrust conspiracy was alleged to exist between Olson Farms and Oakdell
Egg Farms, Inc. to fix prices and monopolize egg buying from fourteen egg producers. Olson
Farms was held liable for damages, but Oakdell Farms escaped damage liability.
127. No. 78-1773, slip op. at 3-4
128. Olson Farms was found guilty of conspiring to monopolize by persuading egg produ-
cers to sell eggs at low prices to the co-conspirators. Olson Farms paid a judgment of more than
$2,400,000, including interest. [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) at 79,700 n.3.
129. Id at 79,704.
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hammered out a contribution bill to "provide for contribution of damages
attributable to an agreement by two or more persons to fix, maintain, or
stabilize prices under section 4, 4(a), or 4(c) of the Clayton Act."'
3 0
This Senate bill, the "Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act," is designed to
"rationalize the process of allocating damages in an antitrust price-fixing
suit, so that price-fixers will pay their fair share of any damages awarded and
so that businesses which find themselves in the midst of a price-fixing suit are
not left responsible for the liability caused by another's wrongdoing."13
The passage of this legislation to permit the contribution among antitrust
defendants will resolve the conflict between the Tenth and other circuits and
will "end the abuse of 'whipsaw tactics' by relieving a defendant of the lia-
bility attributable to the defendants who settle and by allowing the defend-
ant to seek contribution from those conspirators who do not settle, or are not
sued by the plaintiff."
13 2
V. CASE DIGESTS
In King & King Enterprises v. Champhn Petroleum Co. ,33 the Tenth Circuit
upheld a district court's determination of a statute of limitations issue. The
trial court had concluded that evidence indicating that the defendant oil
company actively tried to hide its collusive price-fixing activities was fraudu-
lent concealment as a matter of law.' 34 The appellate court affirmed this
conclusion, holding that the inherently self-concealing nature of price fixing
was not a matter for the jury to determine in connection with the statute of
limitations. The defendant had contended on appeal that most of the plain-
tiff's allegations of illegal price fixing were barred by the four-year statute of
limitations stipulated in the Clayton Act.'
3 5
The appellate court recognized that although the issue of fraudulent
concealment was ordinarily one for the jury, the evidence indicated that the
defendant gasoline retailer's covert collusion with others to set gasoline prices
did not put the plaintiff on inquiry of the defendant's price-fixing
activities. 136
In Montreal Trading Ltd v. Amax Inc. ,"37 the court denied standing to a
Canadian commodities firm that never bought potash from the American
potash producers it sued. The Tenth Circuit ruled that a nonpurchaser who
had not dealt with producers of potash did not have standing to sue for an
alleged price-fixing conspiracy. The court found the injury to the Canadian
commodities trading firm was too remote and too speculative to confer
130. S. 995, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
131. S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
132. Id. at 3.
133. 657 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1981),cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982) (White, J, dissenting).
134. 657 F.2d at 1155-56.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976). This section requires that antitrust actions be commenced
within four years of the date the cause of action was filed. The plaintiff filed its complaint on
Oct. 2, 1975; and the defendant "maintained that ... the plaintiff's claims [which] arose prior
to Oct. 2, 1971 were barred by the statute of limitations or ... should have been submitted to
the jury." 657 F.2d at 1154.
136. Id. at 1156.
137. 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
19831
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standing. The commodities firm had claimed that it was unable to buy pot-
ash to sell to its customers because the defendants were engaged in a con-
certed refusal to deal with Montreal Trading Ltd. The appellate court also
held that the action had no more than a speculative effect on the United
States' economy, and therefore, federal court jurisdiction was not
justified.1
38
The court determined in Black Gold v. Rockwool Industries, Inc. 139 that for
purposes of appellate review, the trial court and jury rulings on antitrust
liability and damages are not final in the absence of a ruling on attorneys'
fees. The court looked at appellate decisions in federal civil rights actions,
which held that the trial court's failure to address a claim for attorneys' fees
rendered the judgment on the merits nonappealable.' 40 The Tenth Circuit
court found no reason to distinguish antitrust cases for purposes of determin-
ing when a judgment was final. The court dismissed the appeal because the
award of attorneys' fees was still under advisement.'41
An Oklahoma beauty and barber supply shop asked the Tenth Circuit
court in Blankens/p v. Herzfeld' 42 to determine whether a cosmetics manufac-
turer's refusal to sell to the supply shop was a conspiracy with another
Oklahoma beauty supply shop to restrain the plaintiff's competition.' 43 The
plaintiff had alleged that Helene Curtis and Herzfeld conspired to cut off
Helene Curtis' sales to the plaintiff because of a sales territory dispute be-
tween the plaintiff and the Herzfeld beauty supply outlets.
144
The Tenth Circuit found that antitrust claims against Helene Curtis
were properly rejected because the manufacturer had legitimate business
reasons for terminating sales to the plaintiff.' 4 5 The case was remanded to
the district court for a determination whether the Herzfeld organization con-
sisted of separate corporations which could have been guilty of a horizontal
138. 661 F.2d at 870.
139. 666 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1981).
140. Id. at 1309.
141. Id
142. 661 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1981).
143. The trial court's decision recognized that a § I per se violation could result from a
conspiracy between single participants on separate tiers of a distribution chain. While the
Tenth Circuit did not question this analysis, there is currently a split among circuits as to
whether a two-party, two-tier conspiracy can ever result in aper se violation. Compare Battle v.
Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 986 (8th Cir. 1982) (reh'g en banc granted); Donald B. Rice Tire
Co. v. Michelin Tire Co., 638 F.2d 15, 16 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Alloy Int'l
Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., Inc., 635 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980); Cernuto, Inc. v. United
Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979) (accepting possibility of per se violation) with Ron
Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Dist., Inc., 637 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831
(1981); H. & B. Equip. Co., Inc. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 579 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978) (noper se
violation without numerosity'on one tier); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d
Cir.) (reh'g en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
The First and Eleventh Circuits apparently recognize the per se violation. See Greyhound
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. City of Pensacola, 676 F.2d 1380 (11 th Cir. 1982); Cory v. Look, 641 F.2d
32 (1st Cir. 1981). The Sixth Circuit apparently splits between panels. Compare Com-Tel, Inc.
v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 413 n.16 (6th Cir. 1982) with Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car
Driveway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1982).
144. 661 F.2d at 842.
145. Id at 845.
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Sherman Act conspiracy against the plaintiff, even though Helene Curtis
was not involved.
Finally, in tydro- Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp. 146 the Tenth Circuit wres-
tled with the question of whether a lawsuit, brought without probable cause
and for an anticompetitive purpose, could qualify as an antitrust violation.
Hydro-Tech, a Colorado corporation, and one of its employees brought an
antitrust action against Sundstrand, stemming from a previous lawsuit
Sundstrand had filed against Hydro-Tech. Sundstrand alleged in its earlier
action that Hydro-Tech had misappropriated trade secrets.
Hydro-Tech sued Sundstrand, claiming that Sundstrand had instituted
the earlier lawsuit to drive Hydro-Tech out of business through long and
costly litigation. Hydro-Tech alleged that Sundstrand's litigation was "with-
out probable cause," and was a guise to eliminate competition by ousting
Hydro-Tech from the centrifugal pump business.'
47
The court, per Judge McWilliams, held that Hydro-Tech's pleadings
were inadequate to state a cause of action under an exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, 148 which sets forth the general rule that "attempts to
influence the government, including petitions to the courts, are exempt from
attack under the Sherman Act."' 49 Thus, attempts to obtain administrative
or judicial action, even if adverse to a competitor, are immune from the
antitrust laws, regardless of intent or purpose. Hydro-Tech, however, had
sought to invoke the antitrust laws through the "sham exception" to the
Noerr-Penn'ngton doctrine. That exception applies when the defendant is not
making a genuine effort to influence legislation through official action by a
government body so that the challenged activities are " 'nothing more' than
an attempt to interfere with the business relationships of a competitor."' t5 0
The Tenth Circuit, noting that the United States Supreme Court had
evidenced an intent in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unh/nited'5 '
that the sham exception be applied only upon a finding of some abuse of the
judicial process,' 52 ruled that the filing of a lawsuit "without probable
cause" does not suffice to invoke the exception.1 53 As a result of its holding,
the court did not address the issue of whether a single sham lawsuit is suffi-
cient to invoke the antitrust laws through the exception.'
54
The court's holding in Hydro-Tech demonstrates that pleadings under
the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine will be subject to exact-
146. 673 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1982).
147. Id at 1174.
148. The doctrine was developed in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965) and Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961). See also Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977); California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
149. 673 F.2d at 1174.
150. Id at 1175 (citing Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec-
utive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977)).
151. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
152. 673 F.2d at 1176 n.6. See also Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1366-
67 (10th Cir. 1972), where the court defined the term "sham" as meaning a misuse or corruption
of the judicial process.




ing scrutiny. The basis for such scrutiny is in the court's conclusion that "the
prosecution of a lawsuit, albeit without probable cause and for an anticom-
petitive purpose, is activity protected by the first amendment .... -155
Therefore, although the court recognized that pleadings are not to be dis-
missed unless it can be shown beyond a doubt that no claim is stated, the
potential chilling effect on first amendment rights by application of the doc-
trine requires more specific allegations than are normally required when as-
serting an antitrust violation based on the "sham litigation" exception. 1
56
Kyra Elizabeth Jenner
155. Id at 1172.
156. Id at 1177 n.8.
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